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Abstract: Any system with a human component is inherently risky. Studies in human factors and psychology 
have repeatedly shown that human operators will inevitably make errors, regardless of how well they are 
trained. Onboard the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time is arguably the most valuable 
resource, errors by the crew or ground operators can be costly to critical science objectives.  Operations 
experts at the ISS Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC), located at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama, have learned that from payload concept development through execution, 
there are countless opportunities to introduce errors that can potentially result in costly losses of crew time 
and science. To effectively address this challenge, we must approach the design, testing, and operation 
processes with two specific goals in mind.  First, a systematic approach to error and human centered design 
methodology should be implemented to minimize opportunities for user error.  Second, we must assume that 
human errors will be made and enable rapid identification and recoverability when they occur. While a 
systematic approach and human centered development process can go a long way toward eliminating error, 
the complete exclusion of operator error is not a reasonable expectation. The ISS environment in particular 
poses challenging conditions, especially for flight controllers and astronauts. Operating a scientific laboratory 
250 miles above the Earth is a complicated and dangerous task with high stakes and a steep learning curve. 
While human error is a reality that may never be fully eliminated, smart implementation of carefully chosen 
tools and techniques can go a long way toward minimizing risk and increasing the efficiency of NASA’s space 
science operations. 
 
I. Introduction 
hroughout history, humans have proven themselves to be both capable of incredible achievement and susceptible 
to catastrophic errors. Between 2005 and 2007, the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey analyzed a 
sample of 5,470 automobile crashes in the United States and determined that 94% of the total crashes could be 
attributed to human error.1 In 2014, IBM’s yearly Cyber Security Intelligence Index revealed that 95% of cyber 
security incidents investigated for the report involved human error.2 And in a study of NASA mishaps between 1996 
and 2005, 57% of type A‡ mishaps were attributed to human error.3 Despite their tendency to commit errors, humans 
remain an integral component of many systems, including payload operations aboard the International Space Station 
(ISS). Fortunately, typical limitations on human perception, cognition, and physical performance have been well 
studied and documented. However, 24 x 7 flight operations present additional, unique challenges to human operators. 
Factors common to space operations environments such as stress and fatigue have proven to further limit human 
information processing and decision making capabilities in individual and unpredictable ways. Because of these and 
other limitations on performance capabilities, human errors are inevitable in all systems with human components. The 
relevant question becomes how to best address human error as a component of ISS payload operations, where errors 
are often costly to critical science objectives. 
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II. Humans Make Mistakes 
At its core, human performance is limited by the capability of the physical human body. Human eyes can only see 
to a certain distance. Human ears can only hear within certain frequencies. Human brains can only process so much 
information simultaneously. Beyond physical limitations, human performance is further complicated by the more 
personal aspects of the human experience. Temporary feelings and conditions like emotion, stress, and fatigue 
significantly impact the performance of human operators in unique ways. Due to the constrained and variable nature 
of human performance, no amount of effort will eliminate human error entirely in systems with human elements. 
However, studying and developing an understanding of the various limits on human capability and the factors that 
influence human behavior can enable us to better predict and eliminate many human errors in space operations. 
A. Visual and Auditory 
 To make decisions and solve problems, humans must first take in information from their surroundings. For the 
average operator, vision serves as the primary source for this information. Human vision can roughly be broken down 
into two stages; physical reception of stimuli, and interpretation and processing of stimuli. When it comes to physical 
reception, the structure of the human eye dictates the way humans perceive characteristics like size, depth, brightness, 
and color. Understanding how the structure of the eye impacts human abilities to perceive visual information can help 
us to eliminate some human errors in operations. For example, we know that cones, one of the two primary types of 
photoreceptors in the retina, are more densely packed toward the center of the visual field. This concentration of cones 
makes it easy for humans to focus on a stimulus at the center of our vision, but difficult to read or distinguish stimuli 
at increasing distances from that focal point. Rods, the other type of photoreceptors in the retina, are concentrated in 
the outer part of the visual field and are sensitive to change. This concentration of change-sensitive rods enables the 
average human to see one specific type of stimulus well in peripheral vision: movement4. Therefore, as designers and 
operators, we can use this knowledge to decrease the odds that a human operator will miss a stimulus in their peripheral 
vision by introducing motion into that stimulus. 
 In order to keep up with the vast number of stimuli physically 
perceived by our eyes each day, humans rely on a variety of visual 
processing techniques. One technique that humans use to resolve 
ambiguity is reliance on expectations. While our expectations 
generally enable us to correctly interpret the information that we see,  
relying on expectations sometimes causes us to make errors. For 
example, is the text in Figure 1 correct? While human perception 
systems tend to be efficient, they are also prone to error. 
 To supplement information gathered via the visual system, 
humans use the auditory system. The human auditory system allows 
the body to collect sounds and interpret them into meaningful 
messages. The human ear is limited by what frequencies it is capable 
of detecting, and if sounds are too loud or frequencies are too 
similar, humans are unable to differentiate sound. In a world of remote operations, operators at the POIC are more 
reliant on their sense of hearing than average workers. Face to face operations with astronauts and scientists are often 
not possible, so a significant amount of information is exchanged solely over voice channels (referred to as loops). 
Most operators monitor many loops simultaneously. For example, the Payload Communications Manager (PAYCOM) 
monitors an average of approximately fifteen loops including four primary Space to Ground (S/G) loops and many 
ground loops. Studies have shown that humans are capable of fully processing only one stream of auditory information 
at a time. When operators are asked to monitor multiple loops simultaneously, the auditory system filters out 
background information (or noise) in order to focus on important information (or signals). When there are multiple 
simultaneous conversations on the loops, operators must cope with what is referred to as a low signal-to-noise ratio. 
Low signal-to-noise ratios have been shown to result in increased frequency of human error.5 
B. Movement 
After a stimulus is received through sensory receptors such as the vision or auditory system, the information is 
transmitted to the brain. The brain processes the information and sends commands to the appropriate muscles to 
respond to the stimulus. This total time required for a human to respond to a stimulus can be broken down into reaction 
time and movement time. Both reaction time and movement time depend on a variety of factors and are subject to 
limitations in human capability. For example, there is a lower limit on how quickly a human operator is capable of 
recognizing that a command needs to be sent, and physically clicking the button to send the command. By effectively 
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Figure 1. Proofreader's Illusion. 
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designing operator tools and environments with human factors in mind, it is possible to minimize movement time. 
However, a human operator will never be capable of instantaneous action. It is important that we consider these and 
additional limitations (such as reach envelopes, repetitive movements, fatigue, etc.)  on human operator capability as 
we design tools, tasks, and processes in our operations environment. For example, an operator will be able to send a 
command more quickly if the tools he must use to do so are comfortably within his reach envelope. If the operator 
must wheel his chair down his desk a few feet and reach for a mouse to send the command, the time required to 
complete the task will be longer. A great deal of work has been done in the field of ergonomics that can be used to 
assist with increasing efficiency and minimizing error by ensuring tools, tasks, and procedures are appropriately 
designed for operators. 
C. Memory 
 The human memory system is used to store and retrieve information. It is generally accepted that there are 
three types of human memory: sensory memory, short-term or working memory, and long-term memory. Sensory 
memory is the shortest term element of memory and is used to store information received through the senses. 
Information stored in sensory memory is either re-written as more information arrives or moved from sensory memory 
into short term memory through attention. Attention is the process used by humans to filter out what is important from 
the vast amount of information in sensory memory at any given time. Humans are able to focus attention selectively, 
but are limited in the number of stimuli they can attend to simultaneously. 
Short-term or working memory is used for temporary recall of information. Short-term memory can be accessed 
rapidly, but it also decays quickly and is limited in capacity. It is relatively well known that the average person is 
limited to recalling 7±2 chunks of information using short term memory. This seems relatively simple, but a lot of 
research has been done on short term memory, and it can be quirky. Things like the recency effect, or the tendency 
for humans to better recall items seen more recently than those in the middle of a list, and interference have been 
shown to impact short term memory under certain circumstances4. 
Long-term memory is used for the long-term storage of information and is where we store everything we know. 
Long-term memory takes longer to access than short-term memory, but has a huge, if not unlimited, capacity. 
Information is moved from short to long-term memory through rehearsal, and many factors such as the total time spent 
learning, the distribution of practice sessions through time, and the meaningfulness of the information impact the 
efficiency of the transition4. After transition to long-term memory, information is subject to decay and interference. 
Information is retrieved from long-term memory through recognition or recall, with recall being the more difficult of 
the two. 
Operators at the POIC rely heavily on memory to recall factual information as well as knowledge of actions and 
procedures. For example, the Operations Controller (OC) is required to recall a wide variety of documentation 
including Payload Regulations and Flight Rules that govern payload operations. While not expected to recall 
everything they have read, OCs are expected to recognize situations that fall under the jurisdiction of existing 
documentation. This is a difficult job that requires efficient and effective recognition and recall abilities. Human 
memory is limited under the best of circumstances, and the flight control environment provides especially challenging 
conditions. Many conditions commonly experienced by flight controllers, such as stress, anxiety, and sleep 
deprivation, have been shown to negatively impact memory. Sleep deprivation specifically has been repeatedly proven 
to negatively impact both working memory and attention.6 
D. Reasoning and Problem Solving 
 After information is received and stored, humans utilize that information to reason and solve problems. These 
thinking processes can be complex and introduce many opportunities for error. One notoriously unreliable technique 
humans commonly use is called inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning involves generalizing from cases seen to 
infer information about cases unseen. Since the number of cases seen is usually limited, inductive reasoning is a useful 
process that humans use out of necessity to draw conclusions about the rest of the world. However, inductive reasoning 
has a high error rate4. For example, a flight controller who has witnessed only false fire alarms may infer that the next 
fire alarm he hears is false as well. The next time there is a true fire event, he may respond less diligently to the alarm 
due to his incorrect inductive reasoning. 
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Another tool humans use to decode the world around them is mental models. Mental models are the theories 
individuals develop to explain the behavior of situations or systems. Mental models are especially dangerous because 
they tend to be partial, unstable, and unscientific. For example, an 
astronaut may develop a mental model that payloads are powered on 
by placing the power switch in the up position because most payloads 
he has seen operate this way. If he is asked to operate a payload that 
is inconsistent with this model, the astronaut may be more likely to 
commit an error and place the switch in the incorrect position. A real 
example of this can be seen with the Minus Eighty-Degree Lab 
Freezer for ISS (MELFI) racks onboard the ISS. For MELFI racks 
located in the US Lab, the rack is powered on by flipping the Rack 
Power Switch (RPS) down as shown in Figure 2. For MELFI racks 
located in the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), the rack is 
powered on by flipping the RPS up. 
One final opportunity for error that will be discussed in this 
abbreviated list is the way humans acquire skills. As humans reach 
mastery of a particular skill, that behavior has a tendency to become 
automatic. Automatic behavior can be efficient, but results in errors 
when the context of the activity changes without the operator 
noticing. For example, a PAYCOM who is accustomed to using S/G 
2 to call astronauts aboard the space station may fail to notice that S/G 
2 has been privatized for a medical conference and make an erroneous 
call on that channel out of habit. 
E. Affect 
The above sections have discussed human perceptual and cognitive abilities under the implied assumption that 
humans operate at full capability most of the time. In truth, human performance and error are much more complicated 
than that. Humans experience a wide range of feelings that are unique to individuals at specific moments in time. 
Affect comprises emotions (such as anger and frustration), moods (such as cheerfulness), and dispositional traits (such 
as competitiveness or optimism). A lot of research has been done on the impact affect has on performance, and that 
research has revealed that affect impacts many skills necessary for successful operations including decision making, 
creativity, prosocial behavior, negotiation, conflict resolution, and leadership effectiveness.7 These findings suggest 
that even the most proficient flight controllers are susceptible to the effects of emotions or moods manifesting within 
their work quality. For example, an operator who consistently earns excellent performance ratings may be pulled over 
by a traffic officer and receive a speeding ticket on the way into work resulting in a negative attitude that hinders her 
decision making for the duration of her shift. 
F. Stress 
 Another factor that has been shown to negatively impact human perceptual and cognitive performance is stress. 
Studies have linked increased stress levels to decreased performance in tasks that utilize memory, especially when 
utilization of working memory or retrieval of information stored in memory is required. Stress has also been linked to 
decreased performance in tasks that require divided attention or decision making.8 Stress tends to be an especially 
difficult condition to quantify and control because it is a highly individualized experience. Conditions that result in 
stress induced errors for one operator may not impact the performance of another. For flight controllers, stress levels 
vary widely and change by the minute. For example, a Stowage engineer may work many hours with no significant 
events, only to be caught completely off guard by a call from an astronaut who cannot find a tool in the provided 
location. The Stowage officer then immediately finds himself under immense pressure to find a workaround for the 
problem by providing alternative locations or backup options for the missing item as quickly as possible to preserve 
available crew time. 
G. Fatigue 
There is a great deal of literature describing the link between fatigue and cognitive impairment. In general, research 
has consistently associated insufficient sleep with “cognitive problems, mood alterations, reduced job performance, 
reduced motivation, increased safety risks, and physiological changes.”9 Many of the most notable disasters in history, 
including the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the loss of NASA’s space shuttle 
Challenger, have been attributed, at least in part, to human error due to sleep deprivation and fatigue.10 In a 24 x 7 
 
 
Figure 2. Rack Power Switch for 
MELFI Rack in the US Lab. 
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space operations environment where operators work schedules that require rotational sleep shifting, fatigue is an 
unavoidable reality. In addition to fatigued ground operators, fatigue of the astronaut crew operators onboard the space 
station must be considered. A 2014 study of 64 astronauts from 80 space shuttle missions and 21 astronauts from 13 
ISS missions concluded that “sleep deficiency was prevalent not only during space shuttle and ISS missions, but also 
throughout a 3 month preflight training interval.”11 
H. Additional Error Producing Factors 
 Additional research in human error has 
focused on the specific features of the tasks 
humans complete. In 1986, J.C. Williams 
developed the Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) to calculate 
the probability that a human error will occur 
during the performance of a particular task. 
The HEART, which is still used today, 
accounts for the impact of a list of pre-defined 
Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) on task 
performance. HEART EPCs represent 
conditions that have been proven through 
research to result in human performance errors 
and include many conditions common in space 
operations. Some of the most significant EPCs 
relevant to space operations include: 
unfamiliarity with a low frequency event, time 
shortage for error detection and correction, low 
signal-to-noise ratio, operator inexperience, a mismatch between the mental models of the operator and the designer, 
a lack of obvious means to reverse unintended actions, information overload, a need to transfer specific knowledge 
from task to task without loss, ambiguity in performance standards, and impoverished quality of information conveyed 
by person to person interaction.5 Table 1 provides a summary of some EPCs ranked in order of known effect per 
HEART guidelines. These examples represent only a small portion of all EPCs that may impact a typical shift for a 
payload operator. However, even this small list sufficiently illustrates the difficulty of reducing human error in a space 
operations environment. 
III. Preventing Errors Before They Occur 
 The first and most effective line of defense that should be implemented against human error is prevention. While 
it will never be possible to prevent all human errors from occurring, it is possible to improve upon current statistics 
by changing the way we think about human error. Dr. James Reason, a leading psychologist in the field of human 
error, has identified two primary paradigms that may be used when addressing the problem of human error: the person 
approach and the system approach.13 In the person approach, blame is placed on the individual who committed the 
error and a moral shortcoming of the operator such as forgetfulness, inattention, or lack of motivation is identified as 
the root cause of the error. Efforts to prevent similar errors from recurring are targeted at attempting to reduce variation 
in individual operator behavior through doing such things as requiring additional training, developing new procedures, 
publicly shaming those who do make mistakes, and sometimes even threatening termination for mishaps. While this 
approach has historically been preferred in the United States, it has some significant drawbacks that must be 
considered. First, a person approach to error discourages error reporting and creates a culture of blame and secrecy. 
Second, this approach fails to identify a root cause that can be reliably fixed. Human performance, by nature, is 
constrained and variable, and no amount of threats or training will prevent humans from making errors. While a person 
approach to error is sometimes necessary to correct recurring abnormal or harmful behavior patterns in specific 
individuals, attempts to achieve complete control over human behavior will always prove futile. 
 The alternative to the person approach, which the POIC has strived to increasingly adopt as we work to combat 
human error, is the system approach. In the system approach, human operators are assumed to be fallible and expected 
to err. The systems approach shifts focus away from the behavioral shortcomings of individual operators and instead 
addresses the external, upstream conditions that allow errors to occur. Errors are viewed as systematically connected 
to the features of operators’ tools and tasks rather than their behavior  alone. Operator behavior is difficult to change, 
but tools and tasks are much simpler to reliably correct. In the systems approach, root cause analyses are conducted 
Table 1. Summary of Error Producing Conditions ranked in 
order of known effect.12 
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to determine the true cause of individual errors, and the root causes are addressed in ways that prevent similar errors 
from being made again by any operator in the future. While it is not possible to engineer out variability in operator 
behavior, it is possible to increase the robustness of systems so that variability no longer results in errors. The systems 
approach is one of constant vigilance and continuous improvement that minimizes errors in organizations by 
systematically eliminating opportunities for those errors to occur. 
I. Data Gathering 
To effectively prevent errors in organizations, we must first understand where those errors are occurring in our 
unique system. To understand what kind of errors are occurring within our operations, the POIC uses tools including 
the POIC Error Log shown in Figure 3 and the Payload Action Item List (PAIL). When a flight controller commits an 
error, the individual is asked to fill out an Error Report through the Error Log. Error reports contain information about 
the console discipline of the 
operator who committed the 
error, the date and time of the 
error, and a written description of 
the error. The Error Report is 
then sent to the team lead of the 
discipline who committed the 
error, and the team lead becomes 
responsible for conducting the 
root cause analysis and supplying 
a resolution for the report. PAILs 
are used to document anomalies 
in payload products that must be 
corrected before that product is 
used again. For example, a PAIL 
would be submitted if the crew onboard the Space Station reported an error in a written procedure. 
There is no one size fits all approach to gathering error data, and individual approaches must be tailored to specific 
organizations and industries. However, one of the most critical steps in gathering accurate data in any organization is 
the creation of a safe and just reporting culture. Employees must have faith that “the boss can hear bad news” and 
reporting their own errors benefits the greater good of the organization. If errors result in consequences viewed by 
employees as unjust, most errors that can be covered up will not be reported. Without an accurate account of mishaps 
and close calls, risk management becomes more difficult for the organization because patterns indicating systematic 
issues may not be discovered until problems become widespread or catastrophic. The POIC error reporting system has 
enabled the identification and correction of many common operator and payload errors. However, culture change is 
still required for these efforts to reach full effectiveness. A stigma on error reporting remains, and many operators are 
hesitant or unwilling to submit reports unless requested to by management. Due to this stigma, errors are not always 
reported honestly and many opportunities for systematic organizational improvement are missed. 
In addition to error reporting systems, debriefs are a useful tool for gathering data on errors and close calls. In 
many industries, for example military aviation, debriefs are standard practice. Within the Space Station program, it is 
common practice to debrief “Lessons Learned” after each flight increment and after significant but uncommon or off-
nominal events. It is also standard practice within the POIC to debrief all simulated training events. These debriefs 
have played a significant role in the identification of error patterns and creation of opportunities for systematic 
improvement in payload operations. However, debriefs have proven difficult to integrate into the current real time 
operations model at the POIC. Managers at the POIC have often discussed the potential benefits of team debriefs after 
each real time console shift ends, but logistical difficulties have so far been determined to outweigh anticipated 
benefits. 
J. Analysis and Prevention Measures 
Once the organization has a better understanding of where errors and close calls are occurring, root cause analyses 
should be conducted to determine why those errors are occurring. Often, human error patterns tend to follow the well-
known Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule), with states that approximately 80% of effects come from 20% 
of causes. Said another way, a study of specific errors in an organization is likely to reveal that around 80% of human 
errors are caused by 20% of causes. Many errors will likely be traced back, at least in part, to operator limitations and 
error producing conditions described in section II of this paper. Payload operations onboard the ISS are multifaceted 
and may be broken down into many different types of operations and errors. 
 
Figure 3. POIC Error Log. 
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1. Command Errors 
One source of error in payload operations is command errors. Command errors occur when an operator sends an 
incorrect command to the ISS or fails to send a command at the appropriate time. To better understand the root causes 
of command errors in ISS spaceflight operations, 
NASA conducted a Human Error Analysis that 
included data from the ISS Command Error Database 
(CED) at Johnson Space Center (JSC). While this 
database does not track errors in payload commands 
from the POIC, it does provide data for commands 
being sent to the ISS from a 24 x 7 operations 
environment similar to the POIC and is therefore a 
useful analogy. The NASA study analyzed data on 
414 errors out of 746,790 total commands captured 
between August 2004 and June 2008. Investigators 
categorized the self-reported contributing factors for 
those errors as shown in Figure 4. The most often 
cited contributing factors were cognitive overload 
and available time, which were cited in 22% and 21% 
of errors, respectively. Additional contributing 
factors included complacency (13%), stress/fatigue 
(10%), procedures (7%), team collaboration (2%) 
and training/experience (2%).14 
Since commanding tasks are software based, 
operator errors can often be effectively addressed 
through targeted human factors improvements to 
existing software tools. For example, a recently 
reported error involved an incorrect command being sent to the ISS. An analysis determined that the command sent 
in error was obsolete, so that command was removed from the operator display entirely. Removing obsolete commands 
from displays may not prevent all command errors, but it does ensure those specific commands will not be sent in 
error by any operator again. In another incident, an operator failed to re-start health and status polling to a payload 
after an off-nominal event. The root cause analysis revealed that power data for payloads in that location was not 
included in the operator’s console display. The missing information was added to the display during the next update, 
and the error has not occurred again. 
For commands deemed to be critical, the POIC employs redundant verification to prevent operator error. Before 
sending a critical command, the commander must obtain permission from the Payload Operations Director (POD) 
who obtains permission from the ISS Flight Director. After 
permission is received, the commander must enable the 
command, select the command, and verify the command 
before it is sent to the vehicle. After a critical command is sent, 
it is automatically disabled to protect against redundant 
delivery. For both critical and non-critical commanding 
operations, verification techniques including software 
prompts like the one in Figure 5 have proven to be a valuable  
defense against errors. They provide operators the option to 
undo unintended actions without causing damage to systems. 
Multiple teams within the POIC have eliminated operator 
errors through the use of redundant operator verification 
within the chain of command and targeted implementation of 
human factors tools such as verification prompts in software 
applications. 
Another technique the POIC has employed to minimize human error is automation. The Payload Rack Officer 
(PRO) team is one of the most commanding-heavy teams at the POIC and takes an especially proactive systems 
approach to commanding errors and automation. The PRO team identifies patterns of recurring errors using the Error 
Log, and develops scripts that guide operators through commanding sequences that are most likely to result in operator 
errors. These scripts automate commands when possible and use prompts to guide operators through coordination and 
 
Figure 4. Error Data Broken Down by Category from the 
ISS Command Error Database.14 
 
 
Figure 2. Command Error Data for the ISS.   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Verification Prompt. 
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decision making tasks that cannot be automated. Command scripts have proven especially useful for sequences of 
commands that are always performed in the same order. For example, PROs utilize a script to power on specific 
chambers within the lab freezers. Command scripts have successfully been used to minimize or eliminate many of the 
most common payload command errors at the POIC. However, automation introduces its own unique challenges. 
Automation may cause operators to become complacent and less situationally aware, which reduces their ability to 
respond to unexpected events in real time. Also, it is important that operators maintain the knowledge necessary to 
recover when automated tools fail to perform as expected. 
  
2. Communication Errors 
Another source of operator error within payload operations, ineffective communication, tends to be more difficult 
to quantify and systematically prevent. While command errors can often be addressed using software solutions, 
communication based tasks are more heavily interpersonal and less amenable to technical solutions. The operations 
model at the POIC is designed around multiple flight control discipline teams who each specialize in a payload system 
and work together to operate payloads owned by remotely located Payload Developers (PDs) and Principal 
Investigators (PIs). Successful payload operations require extensive and efficient communication both within the real 
time flight control room and remotely with payload owners and back room specialists. A 24 x 7 operations model also 
requires shift handovers to communicate relevant information between off-going and on-coming console operators. 
Systematic standardization of such tasks has proven difficult due to the impact personality and communication styles 
have on the way individual operators perform them. Recent examples of payload operations errors ultimately attributed 
to communication errors include: an error in a crew stowage product due to miscommunication with a PD, failure to 
communicate the need for uplink of a real time product from a back room to the flight control team, and failure to 
hand over information between shifts. 
Payload operations necessitate the timely transfer of large amounts of diverse information between many 
stakeholders. To ensure that the information gets to the proper places at the proper time, it is important to establish 
standardized processes for information routing and control. For example, when a crew member onboard the space 
station leaves a written note for the payload operations team, the PAYCOM is responsible for disseminating that 
information to the proper stakeholders. A formal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides instructions for how 
this information should be shared. SOPs are established for many processes and establish consistency, responsibility, 
and accountability for communication practices. When processes are not standardized (or standardized processes are 
not followed), performance standards may be ambiguous to operators, thus resulting in greater error frequency. Errors 
may also occur when communications processes are used inconsistently, or when information is communicated using 
multiple uncontrolled processes. For example, information passed from back room support specialists to real time 
flight controllers is a recurring source of error at the POIC. While a root cause has not been identified, these errors are 
likely at least partly caused by inconsistency in how this information is communicated. For example, at one point in 
time, real time PAYCOMs were required to check at least three separate information sources (including email, 
handover notes, and a daily planning report) to determine whether a back room support specialist had identified any 
topics for the morning Daily Planning Conference. 
When possible, the POIC utilizes software tools to help standardize information routing, for example during shift 
handover. Shift handovers require significant knowledge transfer between operators and, while necessary, introduce 
opportunities for communication errors. To help mitigate communication errors from shift handovers, each cadre 
position is expected to keep a log of pertinent information throughout their shift. Specific log entries that on-coming 
operators need to be aware of or possibly work during their shift, are color coded using position specific flagging 
systems as shown in Figure 6. Flagging a log entry as a “handover item” alerts on-coming operators that they will 
need to take action pertaining to that specific log entry during their shift. Log entries flagged as handover items also 
serve as reminders for the off-
going operator to verbally 
discuss the open item in person 
with the on-coming operator 
before checking out for the 
day. In addition to 
communicating information 
across handovers, console logs 
are a useful tool for 
communicating real time 
operations information to other 
stakeholders. 
 
Figure 6 Logging Tool with Handover Flag.  
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Another software tool used to assist with communication is the Stancil recorder. Most real time operations 
communication is done over voice loops. Flight controllers are required to monitor many loops at a time, which can 
result in a low signal-to-noise ratio and challenge the capabilities of the human auditory and information processing 
systems. The Stancil recorder automatically records voice traffic on most loops, and provides  a backup solution by 
allowing operators to playback information that is not fully understood during initial calls. Operators can search for 
clips by time or loop, and can save and send specific clips to other operators or back room support specialists as 
necessary. 
Checklists may be either software based or simply written on a piece of paper, and may be used to encourage 
consistent, repeatable, and error-free operations. Checklists are standard practice in many high hazard, high 
consequence industries like aviation, medical care, and manufacturing. They are popular because of their demonstrated 
ability to minimize risk and error, and improve efficiency and performance outcomes.15 Many of the most efficient 
payload operators use checklists, but currently, a widespread checklist culture does not exist within the POIC. While 
consistent checklist implementation will not eliminate all errors, it would help mitigate the effects of many of the error 
producing conditions payload operators must cope with daily. 
Real time payload operations are constantly changing and often unpredictable. Standardized procedures and 
checklists are important tools, but cannot account for the wide variety of potential outcomes. To cope such uncertainty, 
human operators themselves must be trained to serve as 
a defense against error. To effectively prepare operators 
for such challenging jobs, a technique called Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) may be useful. 
Pioneered by NASA research in response to a series of 
aviation disasters in the 1970s, CRM focuses on 
improving operator performance through emphasis on 
the interpersonal and cognitive skills necessary to 
manage resources in complex systems. Skills targeted 
for improvement through CRM include 
communication, leadership, situational awareness, 
teamwork, conflict resolution, stress management, and 
decision making. CRM encourages cooperation 
through leadership at all levels, and seeks to empower 
all operators to speak up when necessary. In highly 
technical industries like space payload operations, the 
“soft skills” emphasized by CRM are sometimes 
neglected in favor of emphasis on technical skills. This 
is a loss, because while technical skills are important, 
operators thoroughly trained in both technical and 
CRM skills are more empowered in systems requiring 
interpersonal cooperation, and are likely to be better 
prepared to achieve positive outcomes despite error 
producing conditions in the workplace. 
 
3. Hardware Errors 
For operations that require the use of tools or hardware, the hardware itself may be considered an important tool 
in error prevention. Clever implementation of human factors theories and techniques in the hardware design phase can 
go a long way toward elimination of operator error during the operations phase. One example of such a technique is 
poka- yoke mistake proofing. The term poka-yoke was coined in Japan by an engineer working at Toyota in the 1960s 
and is still in wide use in industrial engineering today. Essentially, poka-yoke devices prevent, correct, or clearly draw 
attention to operator errors as they occur. Poka-yoke devices are especially useful in hardware that will be operated 
by astronaut crews. One example of poka-yoke hardware currently used onboard the space station is keyed connectors. 
Keyed connectors may only be assembled one way, the correct way, thereby preventing operator errors by disallowing 
incorrect assembly. 
Because payloads are designed and manufactured by a wide variety of payload developers, standardizing payload 
hardware to human factors design criteria can be a challenge. To assist payload developers as they design hardware, 
the Space Station program provides a variety of resources. The Human Factors Implementation Team (HFIT) includes 
 
Figure 7 Foundations of Crew Resource Management. 
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astronaut representatives and human factors experts, and helps 
identify potential human factors issues early in the hardware 
design process. The Astronaut Office also provides consultation 
and feedback for hardware operability differences that may be 
encountered in microgravity. For example, payload developers 
may not consider that fasteners and screws are difficult to keep 
track of in microgravity. An expert in microgravity operations 
may suggest the use of captive fasteners, like the one shown in 
Figure 8, to prevent fastener loss and preserve crew time. The ISS 
Payload Label Approval Team (IPLAT) ensures consistency in 
crew interface payload labeling to facilitate crew understanding 
of hardware. For payloads that include crew interfaces with 
graphic user displays, the Payload Displays Review Team 
(PDRT) performs usability testing and suggests ways interfaces 
should be improved. Taking the proper time to design hardware 
for usability now is an investment that can greatly reduce the risk 
of operator errors that may result in science loss later. 
Human factors and usability should also be considered in the design of hardware tools that will be utilized by 
operators on the ground. Tools should be designed to support operators in the tasks they are performing, and should 
be developed using an iterative process that incorporates user feedback into the design. Common usability techniques 
like color coding, auditory cues, standardization with familiar systems, elimination of unnecessary options, and undo 
capability have all proven useful in payload operations. When errors occur, the results of root cause analyses should 
be fed back to hardware design teams who have the ability to improve interfaces through updates or redesigns. 
Sometimes, operators themselves configure their personal tool setups to prevent errors. For example, one of the most 
significant PAYCOM errors is accidental transmission over space to ground. To prevent accidental selection of a  
space to ground loop, many PAYCOMs have configured their loop selection panel to separate the space to ground 
loops from other commonly used loops. This minimizes the chance that a PAYCOM will accidentally select a space 
to ground loop in error. 
While the POIC has successfully taken strides toward implementing a system approach to human error, there is 
still room to improve. Root cause analyses for error reports are typically performed by individual discipline teams 
with few standard processes or requirements. Consequently, the approach taken by individual analysts varies widely 
between the person and systems approaches. Many errors attributed to human error have been resolved with statements 
such as: operator will pay more attention next time, operator was reminded of the proper protocol, will continue 
training and stress accuracy of products, or no corrective action necessary. Unfortunately, resolutions like these fail 
to address the root causes of the errors and do little to prevent future operators from repeating them. In a dynamic 
operations environment, there is always risk that an error that is harmless under one set of conditions may result in 
significant impact upon recurrence. To achieve continued positive improvement in human error rates at the POIC, a 
systems approach must consistently be applied to all root cause analyses so underlying causes of errors are effectively 
identified and addressed. 
IV. Responding to Errors 
A consistent, systematic approach to error prevention is a powerful tool that can be used to minimize or eliminate 
many common operator errors. However, some level of operator error will always remain and must be accepted as an 
operational constraint. Assuming that some errors will slip through even the best prevention systems, organizations 
should consider how to best prepare for and respond to those errors that do occur. To effectively minimize the negative 
impacts of these errors, systems must have the ability to do three things: identify that an error has occurred, reduce 
the impact of the error, and recover from the error. 
K. Identify Errors 
To effectively respond to an error, operators must first recognize that an error has occurred. For tasks with end 
items that can be monitored by software, detection of off-nominal conditions caused by errors is relatively rapid at the 
POIC. Operators utilize a variety of software tools to constantly monitor health and status parameters for racks and 
payloads that generate visual cues and alert tones when parameters go out of limits. Many of the software based tools 
used for identification of off-nominal conditions, for example POIC’s Exception Monitoring tool, utilize a 
combination of human factors friendly elements like auditory cues and color coding to help operators identify and 
 
Figure 8 Captive fastener on payload 
hardware. 
 
11 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
rapidly process error messages. Another tool is Fault Summary, which is used to alert console operators and station 
crew to off-nominal events onboard the space station. Fault Summary codes notifications for emergencies red, 
warnings pink, cautions yellow, and advisories blue. Color coding systems like these allow operators to more rapidly 
assess the criticality of error messages that would otherwise take longer to process. When minimized, Fault Summary 
automatically pops up from the task bar any time a new message populates in the display. This motion effectively 
grabs the attention of operators, even from their peripheral vision. 
Errors that cannot be immediately identified by software may be more difficult to detect. Some errors are obvious, 
for example an accidental transmission on space to ground. Other errors, like an incorrect location code provided for 
an item in a stowage note, may not be noticed until an astronaut attempts to execute the activity and reports them. For 
errors like these, checklists can be useful tools to help identify steps that have been missed. 
L. Reduce Impact 
 After errors are made, focus should switch to minimizing the immediate impact of the error on the system. Efforts 
to reduce the impact of operator errors should be both proactive, targeting errors that have not yet occurred, and 
reactive, targeting errors that have already occurred. One technique commonly used to proactively minimize the 
impact of future errors is fault tolerance. Fault tolerance allows systems to continue to operate nominally after 
experiencing one or more failures, and should be designed into hardware and processes whenever feasible. Fault 
tolerant systems should be robust enough to accommodate the variability of human behavior, and able to endure one 
or more operator errors without impact to end products or customers. At the POIC, fault tolerance is generally achieved 
through redundancy. For example, in an effort to preserve valuable astronaut crew time, all products uplinked for use 
by the crew go through a formal, multi-layer review and approval process. Products are reviewed by enough reviewers 
that errors missed by one reviewer are usually caught by another. The redundancy in this process allows for individual 
reviewers to make isolated errors without compromising the quality of the end product. The Space Station program 
also utilizes redundant hardware whenever possible, and many systems onboard have some combination of hot and 
cold backups. Fault tolerance does not prevent operator errors, but it does prevent those errors from negatively 
impacting the operability of the system. 
 For errors that occur despite our best proactive efforts, a reactive approach to mitigate their impact becomes 
necessary. In a dynamic system like payload operations, the first step in containing impacts is identifying them. In 
some cases, impacts caused by errors may be obvious, but in cases where the impacts are varied or complex, 
identifying and quantifying those impacts may be difficult and time consuming. In real time operations environments, 
conditions are constantly changing and impacts of errors may be additionally complicated by time or path dependency. 
These impacts may vary widely in severity depending on the specific conditions present at the time of impact, and an 
error that causes no impact at one time may result in a significant impact at another due to condition changes. For 
example, a power cycle to a facility that provides services to multiple payloads has the potential for either very low 
or very high impact depending on the state of the individual payloads in that rack. At one moment, all the payloads in 
the rack may be dormant and indifferent to a power cycle. At another moment, a power cycle may result in complete 
loss of science for one or more of those payloads. In off-nominal events, operators at the POIC are trained to determine 
the impacts to their systems and report them to the POD as soon as possible. 
 After the POD compiles the list of impacts, he must decide how to most efficiently and effectively minimize 
damage caused by those impacts. In payload operations, this process typically includes real time stakeholder analysis 
coupled with consultation of documentation of pre-determined priorities. Priority is generally given to successful 
completion of science objectives, but tradeoffs must often be made with regard to stakeholder considerations such as 
astronaut crew time, station resources such as power and cooling, impacts to international partners, and impacts to 
other science experiments. In situations like these, established operations documents like Flight Rules and Payload 
Regulations are valuable tools. Documentation provides a consistent, pre-determined impact reduction method for 
many situations. Another important technique used to reduce the impact of errors in operations is workarounds. 
Workarounds, or temporary fixes used to accomplish goals, allow the operations team to continue to execute payload 
operations despite noticeable failures or impacts. For example, a lost tool may be substituted with a different but 
similar tool as a workaround to preserve science and keep operations on schedule for the day. 
M. Recover 
Once short-term impacts are contained and workarounds are implemented, the final step in error response is 
recovering from the error. Ideally, recovery is accomplished quickly by the real time operations team. However, in 
some cases, recovery efforts may be handed over to the next shift or to a back room support team if recovery is not 
time critical, requires additional expertise or extensive cross-organizational coordination, or detracts from other 
critical real time operations. Recovery efforts may have a combination of technical and non-technical elements, and 
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often require follow up with stakeholders. For errors reported to the ground by the crew, it is sometimes necessary to 
follow up with a resolution. Scope and methods of recovery effort vary widely based on the nature of the error and 
severity of impact, but they should always include documentation. Error documentation is critical for historical 
recording, and an important source of lessons learned for the future. Documentation also informs a thorough root 
cause analysis of the error, which enables the organization to explore ways to prevent the error from happening again 
by instituting a systems approach to error prevention. 
V. Conclusion 
On an orbiting laboratory where critical science opportunities may not be repeatable and scarce resources are often 
not replaceable, the margin for error is unforgiving. Every operator error poses a risk to science outcomes and 
resources, and should be addressed with due diligence. There is no one size fits all method for addressing operator 
error, but the POIC has discovered that some practices are especially useful in space payload operations. A 
consistent, systems approach to human error prevention that emphasizes continuous improvement of operator tools 
and processes is vital to eliminate opportunities for error. Human factors and usability techniques including 
automation, information routing and control, standardization, and iterative design processes that include user 
feedback have been successfully employed to reduce operator errors in payload operations. Operators proficient in 
interpersonal and leadership skills such as those emphasized by Crew Resource Management provide an additional 
line of defense against error, and are better equipped to minimize the impact of errors that do occur. Operating a 
laboratory 250 miles above Earth is a unique challenge that provides endless opportunities to battle human error in 
the pursuit of excellence in payload operations.  
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